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Abstract
Russia works hard to create a capitalistic system. Although only established in 1991, Russia’s
securities market has already attracted a large number of foreign investors. The American financier
George Soros has already invested US $1 billion in the Russian economy. Although experts agree
that its potential is enormous, the newborn Russian capital market contains a significant amount
of risk. This Essay shows the basic features of the development of the Russian Securities Law,
analyzes the present market conditions, and shares some ideas for the near future.
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INTRODUCTION
Russia works hard to create a capitalistic system. Although
only established in 1991, Russia's securities market has already
attracted a large number of foreign investors. The American fin-
ancier George Soros has already invested US$1 billion in the
Russian economy.' Although experts agree that its potential is
enormous, the newborn Russian capital market contains a signif-
icant amount of risk. This Essay shows the basic features of the
development of the Russian Securities Law, analyzes the present
market conditions, and shares some ideas for the near future.
I. SECURITIES AND THE FREE MARKET IN RUSSIA
During the first stage in the privatization process, which was
completed on July 1, 1994,2 nearly 100,000 state-owned enter-
prises changed their form of ownership, about 12,500 of which
became private.3 Appraising the results of the first stage of priva-
tization, experts have concluded that the physical transfer of
stocks to workers and employees did not, and could not, bring
about radical changes in the economy. The real consequences
appeared in the second stage of privatization, when those who
had money and knew how to invest it bought stocks from the
state and private stockholders.
* LL.M. candidate, 1998, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Tatyana Koshkareva & Rustam Narzikulov, Russia Has Become a Klondike for Inter-
national Fund Speculators, RussiAN PRESS DIGEST, Oct. 31, 1997. Russian newspapers have
published a list of twenty foreign investment funds operating in Russia. Id. This list
does not show all such funds, only the most successful whose profit is 95% or more. Id.
The greatest players on the market are the "Hermitage Fund" with a profit of almost
280% from January to August 1997, and the "Templeton-Russia Fund," an investment
group based in Singapore. Id.
2. The unprecedented voucher privatization ("voucherization") began in Decem-
ber 1992 and has since been completed. Private property has been reborn in Russia: a
majority of the companies in all sectors of economy have been privatized.
3. Igor Karpenko, Russia's all-out Voucherization Ends. Redivision of Property Continues,
RussiAN PRESS DIGEST, June 30, 1994, at 36.
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Pessimists predicted that privatization would result in a fi-
asco, on the theory that Russian people reject the notion of pri-
vate property. Indeed, unprepared for such a crucial twist in
their lives, a majority of the shareholders have lost a sense of
reality. They obtained the vouchers virtually for free, and did
not understand what to do with them. The seventy-five year pe-
riod of communism virtually erased the word "owner" from peo-
ple's minds. In connection with the psychological status of po-
tential investors, the Russian Government has issued a statement
declaring that:
[N] ow that the first, voucher stage of privatization has come
to an end, the privatization policy must be aimed at stimulat-
ing investment and structural shifts in the economy, securing
dynamic advance of the stock market, and improving man-
agement of all types of property.
Attempts at revising this policy, giving up the Results of
the privatization drive, and editing the President's and Gov-
ernment's decisions, as well as calls to 'nationalize' some
privatized enterprises are groundless. The right of ownership,
which has emerged as a result of privatization as one of the
most important constitutional rights in Russia, will be stead-
fastly protected by the Government.4
The proliferation of new enterprises created more than
forty million shareholders, a prodigious number by Russian stan-
dards.' While some of the shareholders tried to sell their shares,
the lack of liquidity in the market made this a difficult task. In-
dustries such as oil and gas, non-ferrous metallurgy,
automobiles, telecommunications, consumer goods, and media
represented the remarkable exceptions. The shares of these
companies has reached market price, and sufficient information
about them is available. Market insiders believe that the remain-
der of Russian enterprises will likely catch up as the Russian
economy matures.
The Russian market's most highly rated shares belong to the
larger energy, communication, and utilities companies. These
include Rostelecom, Kamaz, Komineft, and Krasny Oktybr. The
most prominent star on the market, and the best performer to
4. Statement by the Government of the Russian Federation §5 (1995), available in
1995 WL 7716980.
5. Karpenko, supra note 3, at 36.
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date, is LUKoil, a company that many predict will soon grow to
become the largest company in the country. LUKoil's capitaliza-
tion constitutes nearly ten percent of the entire Russian stock
market.
The commercial companies, banks, and investment funds in
Russia began to issue securities in 1991. Unfortunately, this nor-
mally routine method of generating funds fell prey to a variety of
con artists and swindlers in company management who either
disappeared with investors' money or declared bankruptcy.
Consequently, the current liquidity value and reliability of the
various private companies' shares tends to vary widely from com-
pany to company.
In contrast, commercial banks are seen as a more solid in-
vestment. Shares of many stable Russian commercial banks have
greater liquidity, and are reliable and trusted by their investors.
Moreover, the dividend yield for most commercial bank stocks
has been consistently high, with a considerable number report-
ing 300% to 400% dividend rates in 1993. In 1994, many banks
took advantage of investor interest and increased their share is-
sues. While some market watchers maintain that this resulted in
an overvaluation of those shares, the act almost certainly en-
sured the banks' stability and ability to maintain high yield rates
over the long term. The most reliable and profitable of the com-
mercial bank stocks are Incombank, Tokobank, Toribank,
Neftehimbank, Unikombank, and Sberbank of Russia. Second
on the list of the most popular Russian stocks in this category are
shares of newly formed private trade firms and companies in-
volved in Russia's emerging service sector. These tend to issue
shares with a small nominal value that are not registered to any
particular individual and that do not require identification of an
owner, but are issued to a bearer who has the authority to collect
funds. Known as "street shares," these stocks are usually issued
for short-term operations and therefore carry a high risk.
Under Russian law,6 these bearer shares are technically ille-
gal, but despite several well-publicized scandals, the shares are
still widely circulated. The market price of these shares oscillates
around their nominal value, dipping as much as two to three
times below nominal value during times of light trading. The
6. Statute on Issue of Securities and on Stock Exchanges, Government Decree No.
78 (Russ. 1991), available in 1991 WL 3371436.
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most popular among such companies are Doka-khleb, Sistema
Telemarket, AVVA, Olbi-Diplomat, and Holding-Tsentr. Third
on the list of viable stocks in this category are investment funds,
which were created during privatization to collect vouchers that
were subsequently invested in the shares of privatized enter-
prises. The largest of these investment funds have up to several
million shareholders, although they tend to be low in liquidity
and yield small dividends.
A. Establishment of a Federal Securities Commission and
Licensing Regime
Probably the most significant measures were taken in Fall
1994 when the Russian President signed Decree No. 2063 of No-
vember 4, 1994, entitled Measures for State Regulation of the
Securities Market in the Russian Federation.7 The decree served
five main objectives. First, it forms a new regulatory agency in
Russia called the Federal Securities and Stock Market Commis-
sion to control the securities industry.8 Second, it vests this
agency with regulatory authority previously shared by different
ministries.9 Third, it establishes a licensing regime for securities
professionals."0 Fourth, it initiates universal registration rules
for securities to be traded in the public market," and, finally, it
creates a ground for a legal framework of securities regulation. 12
These measures mainly represent a political response to the fall-
out from financial scandals that shook the country throughout
1994, including the fiasco of financial pyramid schemes of Rus-
sian investment companies such as MMM and Tibet. Many in-
vestments made by individuals in such companies were not even
memorialized by certificates that complied with Russian law to
qualify them as securities enforceable against the issuer. Many
of these investments were also not registered with the Ministry of
Finance pursuant to a compulsory requirement.13 Millions of
Russian citizens lost their investments in high-profile investment
7. Measures For State Regulation of the Securities Market, President's Decree No.
2063 (Russ. 1994), available in 1994 WL 9141402.
8. Id. art. 6 § 1, at 3.
9. Id. art. 6 § 9, at 4.
10. Id. art. 1 § 1, at 1.
11. Id. art. 1 § 3, at 1.
12. Id. art. 1-15, at 1-6.
13. Some Changes in the Rules of Fabrication and Registration of Securities, Gov-
ernment Decree No. 657 (Russ. 1993), available in 1993 WL 10409594.
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funds and other securities institutions that lacked proper
licenses and were specifically used for large-scale market manip-
ulation and fraud. Some of these companies engaged in illegal
securities transactions with the sole purpose of defrauding the
public.14 The Russian legal system has demonstrated a stark in-
ability to deal with financial crimes.
Such events, covered by the Western media in excruciating
detail, did not improve the reputation of the Russian Federation
as a desirable host country for foreign investment. As a result of
this negative publicity, the Russian Government placed priority
on legislation geared to bring order to the securities market.
Decree No. 206315 ("Decree 2063") specifically described its pur-
pose as to "ensure state regulation on the financial market and
the securities market in the RF, and of relations taking shape in
the process of securities trading, and in order to prevent abuses
and breaches of rights of citizens."1 6 The Russian government
had manifested its intent to regulate financial and securities
markets as early as 1992 when, as part of the Decree No. 1186 of
October 7, 199217 (."Decree 1186"), the Russian President re-
quired that certain securities institutions be licensed.' 8 Decree
1186 also created the Securities and Stock Exchange Commis-
sion to oversee the stock market.1 9 Like many Russian govern-
ment decrees, however, its passing was premature and its imple-
mentation slow. The Securities and Stock Exchange Commis-
sion barely existed for two years. Decree 2063 strengthened the
prior regulations by requiring that "entrepreneurial activity in
the securities market in the Russian Federation, including the
rendering of services in issuance, purchase and sale of securities,
shall be carried out exclusively on the basis of licenses issued to
professional securities specialists. ' 20 Decree 2063 also empowers
the Federal Commission ("Commission"), the successor to the
14. Thomas A. Dine, Lessons from a Russian Scandal, J. COMM., Aug. 25, 1994, at 6a.
15. Measures for the State Regulation of the Securities Market, President's Decree
No. 2063 (Russ. 1994), available in 1994 WL 9141402.
16. Id. at pmbl.
17. Organization of Securities Market as State and Municipal Enterprises are Priva-
tized, President's Decree No. 1186 (Russ. 1992), available in 1992 WL 8933201.
18. Id. at annex 1, art. 19, § 2.
19. Id. art. 8 § 1.
20. Measures For the State Regulation of the Securities Market in the Russian Fed-
eration, President's Decree No. 2063 art. 1, § 1 (Russ. 1994), available in 1994 WL
9141402.
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Securities and Stock Exchange Commission, to stop violations of
the securities laws and to prevent unlicensed participants from
operating in the market. 21 In addition, Decree 2063 enumerates
business activities and operations that can be legally undertaken
in connection with securities22 and provides a procedure to stop
unlicenced securities institutions from operating before major
financial crises develop. Unlawful securities transactions may
now be invalidated by legal or administrative actions before in-
vestors lose their savings.23
While Decree 2063 defines the types of securities activities
subject to its regulatory authority, it also refers to "activity in or-
ganization of securities trading, rendering of services, promoting
securities transactions between professional participants in the
securities market, including the activity of securities ex-
changes. '24 This language is broad enough to include non-se-
curities specialists who may advise institutions or other profes-
sional services such as accounting, legal, or insurance services
acting in connection with securities activities. Some foreign pro-
fessionals practicing in Russia, including lawyers, insurance
agents, accountants, stock brokers, and bankers, fear that Decree
2063 may require them to obtain licenses despite their remote-
ness to the securities market. Presumably, each separate securi-
ties activity named above would require a separate license.
Decree 2063 also prohibits public securities offerings with-
out a prior registration with the Commission. 5 It is not clear
how the registration requirement applies to non-public offerings
-such as private placements and other offerings granted "ex-
emptions" from registration in other securities regimes, includ-
ing those under the U.S. federal securities laws. Upon a closer
reading, Decree 2063 implies that an exemption, once statutorily
or administratively defined, will be a narrow one. Article 4 of
Decree 2063 enumerates the types of securities for which regis-
tration is required in order to lawfully distribute and sell such
securities to the Russian public. These include:
-government securities;
21. Id. Annex 1, art. 5 §§ 1-16, at 7-9; art. 7 §§ 1-10, at 9-10.
22. Id. art. 2 §§ 1-6, at 1-2.
23. Id. art. 5, at 3.
24. Id. art. 2 § 7, at 2.
25. Id. art 5, at 3.
17771998]
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-registered shares of stock issued by stock associations and
banks;
-options and warrants;
-bonds, including government bonds;
-certificates of title to residential dwellings; and
-other securities recognized by Russian law or by interna-
tional treaties to which the Russian Federation is a signa-
tory.26
Decree 2063 empowers the Commission to establish rules
and regulations governing registration of securities and offer-
ings.27 Most importantly, by acting together with the Central
Bank, the Commission is authorized to terminate an unlawful
distribution or sale of any unregistered securities. 28 The Minis-
try of Finance traditionally served as the primary source of secur-
ities regulations, having concurrent powers with the Central
Bank to regulate the securities activities of depository institu-
tions.
A separate Appendix to Decree 2063 confers broad regula-
tory and advisory powers to the Commission. The Commission is
authorized to promulgate standards for issuing and distributing
securities and for carrying out professional activities in the secur-
ities market. It is also charged with issuing rules on corporate
disclosure to investors. In addition to advisory functions in con-
nection with drafts of new securities legislation, the Commission
is empowered to make rulings on disputes brought before it, to
issue, suspend and revoke licenses, audit the financial condition
of securities issuers, provide information to other law enforce-
ment agencies, and to appear in court as plaintiff in order to
invalidate unlawful securities transactions. Decisions of the
Commission may be appealed to the Russian president's office
or by filing a legal action with a court of law or a court of arbitra-
tion. 2 9
Members of the Commission ("Commissioners") are to be
appointed by the Presidential Administration, Ministry of Fi-
nance, the State Property Committee, the Federal Property
Fund, the Ministry of Justice, the State Anti-monopoly Commit-
tee, the State Tax Service, the State Authority for Non-govern-
26. Id. art. 4, at 3.
27. Id. Annex 1, art. 5 § 2, at 7.
28. Id. Annex 1, art. 5 § 6, at 8.
29. Id. Separate Annex, art. 7 § 8, at 10.
INVESTING IN RUSSIAN SECURITIES
mental Pension Funds, the Federal Insurance Authority, the
Central Bank of the Russian Federation, and one representative
each from the two chambers of the Russian Parliament. ° A
board of experts from government and the private sector advises
the newly appointed Commissioners. Despite many difficulties
in the early stages of its operation, the Commission has begun to
influence the market and plans to regularly publish information
on its decisions, regulatory actions, and Russian securities legisla-
tion in conjunction with its regulatory and oversight functions.
Another important legislative development was the adop-
tion of the Decree of the Russian Government No. 336 of April
15, 1995 on Measures for Further Development of the Securities
Market in the Russian Federation ("Decree 336").31 Decree 336
sets forth the necessary components of a market infrastructure
and enumerates the steps necessary for their implementation.
These components include clearance and settlement capability,
computerized organized trading facilities, informational serv-
ices, and reliable custodial services.
The new Decrees noted above represent an improvement of
the initial basic legislative acts on securities enacted in 1991 and
1992. Decree No. 1769 of October 27, 1993 entitled Measures to
Ensure Shareholders' Rights ("Decree 1769") imposed record-
keeping requirements on the obligation of publicly-held (open)
stock associations to maintain a record of stock transfer proce-
dures.32 Decree No. 1233 of June 11, 1994, provided additional
safeguards with respect to registration of securities transfers and
nominee ownership.3
B. Struggle Over Regulatory Authority and the Separation of
Power Doctrine
The rapid development of Russia's securities market stands
in sharp contrast to the "back-and-forth" power between the
Commission and Central Bank for authority to regulate it.3 4 At a
30. Id. art. 6 § 4, at 4.
31. Measures for Development of the Securities Market, Government Decree No.
336 (Russ. 1995), available in 1995 WL 9700045.
32. Measures to Ensure the Rights of Shareholders, President's Decree No. 1769
(Russ. 1993), available in 1993 WL 10409648.
33. Protection of Investors' Interests, President's Decree No. 1233 (Russ. 1994),
available in 1994 WL 9141242.
34. In 1992, President's Decree No. 1186 created the Commission with broad pow-
1998] 1779
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conference on the Russian securities market sponsored by the
Harriman Institute,35 Peter Borenboim, Vice President of the
Union of Advocates of the Moscow City Bar Association, defined
a protocol signed by the Commission and the Central Bank on
May 29, 1997, as "the end of a long-running bureaucratic dis-
pute, which has been causing confusion and frustration in Rus-
sia's rapidly growing capital market."36 The protocol grants the
Central Bank authority to license commercial bank activities in
the equity market and increases shifts the balance of power be-
tween the Central Bank and the Commission to regulate the cap-
ital market in favor of the Central Bank. 7
The regulatory dispute between the Commission and Cen-
tral Bank hinges on the question of what economic model is best
for Russia. While the Central Bank favors bank-centered system
similar to the German model, the Federal Commission supports
a stock market-based system controlled by an independent regu-
lator, as in the United States and the United Kingdom. The May
29, 1997 Protocol represents the defeat of the Commission's
view.
According to Barenboim, the Commission has undermined
its own prospects in several ways. First, it opposed compromise
with capital market participants and the reformers from the Cen-
tral Bank. Second, it failed to protect the investors' interests by
inadequately policing questionable market participants. Third,
it rejected well-capitalized banks from the securities market.3
Fourth, the Commission unnecessarily burdened the market
with detailed and intrusive regulations.3 9 Finally, it.adopted a
ers to make rules, exercise market oversight, and promote practices consistent with
international standards. In practice, however, competing authorities including the
Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Property Committee regulated the
securities market from the beginning.
35. Conference Calendar, Russ. & COMM. Bus. L. RPT., June 4, 1997, at 5. The Con-
ference on Russian Securities on the American and Russian Capital Markets was spon-
sored by Harriman Institute of Columbia University. Among the participants were Alex-
ander Zaharov, General Director of the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange, Peter
Barenboim, representative of the International Bar Association of the CIS, Thomas San-
ford, Vice President of the Bank of New York, and Richard Bernard, Executive Vice
President of the New York Stock Exchange.
36. See Protocol Between FCSM and Central Bank as Stabilizing Force, Following Struggles
Over Regulatory Authority, 10 INT'L SEC. REG. REwT. 15 (1997).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. (explaining which exchange should trade which corporate securities).
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different legal standard for government and corporate securi-
ties.4 °
Despite its controversial nature, the protocol expresses opti-
mism about the future of the Russian securities market and its
regulation. It shows that the parties in dispute can reach some
compromise, and raises a question about the necessity of choos-
ing an adequate form of regulatory body. Some experts, includ-
ing Borenboim, opine that Russian capital market should follow
the U.S. example of defending small investors while at the same
time avoiding over-regulation.4" One can argue that separation
of power among the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance, and
the Commission will eliminate over-regulation, but this would
undoubtedly bring confusion to the market. Cherie Loessberg,
General Counsel to Brunswick Brokers in Moscow and head of
the Subcommittee on Securities of the American Chamber of
Commerce in Russia, believes that this protocol will end the con-
flict among regulators.
4 2
II. CREATING AN INVESTOR-FRIENDLY MARKET
A day before his re-election, Russian President Boris Yeltsin
signed two landmark decrees which, together with the new Law
on Securities Markets of April 1996,4" bolster the Russian capital
markets by increasing their stability and thus their attractiveness
to domestic and foreign investors. Decree No. 1008 On the Es-
tablishment of the Concept of Development for the Securities
Market in the Russian Federation" ("Framework Decree") pro-
vides a blueprint for the future of regulatory oversight of Russian
40. Id. Borenboim explains that, by instituting a double standard, the Commission
intended to separate the market for governmental and corporate securities in terms of
licensing. The protocol provides for a single license to sell both types of the securities.
The Commission will license securities market participants. It will issue a general li-
cense to the Central Bank, and thereafter the Central Bank will license and supervise
the securities market activities of credit companies. The rest of the "securities pie" is
divided between the Ministry of Finance, which will register the securities of insurance
institutions, and the Central Bank, which will register the securities of commercial
banks.
41. Id. at 16.
42. Id.
43. Russian Federation Securities Market Act 39-FZ (1996), available in 1996 WL
8952954.
44. On the Establishment of the Concept of Development for the Securities Mar-
ket, President's Decree No. 1008 (Russ. 1996) [hereinafter President's Decree No.
1008] (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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capital markets and strengthens the role of self-regulating orga-
nizations in securities-related industries.
The Framework Decree lays out the Russian Government's
policy and legislative agenda for the securities market, and oper-
ates to stimulate domestic and foreign investment in Russian
companies. In addition, it aims to balance the need for regula-
tion of securities issues and distribution with the need to create a
stable, investor-friendly climate that would allow Russian compa-
nies to compete for capital in the international market place.
The Framework Decree identifies six main goals for securities
market regulators:
(1) developing an effective mechanism for attracting inves-
tors to the private sector of the Russian economy;
(2) financing the federal deficit through non-inflationary
means;
(3) increasing efficiency in the management of privatized en-
terprises, particularly enterprises with substantial govern-
ment participation, by setting up managerial retraining
and incentive programs for payment discipline and mar-
ket-oriented project development;
(4) protecting securities market participants against unfair
market manipulation;
(5) integrating the Russian securities market with interna-
tional capital markets through primarily depository re-
ceipts (GDRs, ADRs)45 while insuring the independence
of the Russian securities market; and
(6) closely regulating surrogate securities and derivatives,
and policing for fraud and illegal activities in the securi-
ties market.46
The Framework Decree also provides that the first phase of
regulatory review should emphasize elimination of the so-called
registrar risk47 and foster increased scrutiny of quasi-monetary
45. GDR refers to Global Depository Receipt and ADR refers to American Deposi-
tary Receipt.
46. President's Decree No. 1008, supra note 44, art. 3.1.
47. The early Russian registrars were completely inexperienced and operated
under few controls. They used primitive systems and procedures, determined their own
preconditions for transferring ownership on their books, and set their own fees for
doing so. Nor was there a regulator imposing standards or auditing registrars' activities
in offices dispersed across a vast country usually inside company gates. All of these
factors combined to make potential wary of the Russian market. To date, in many in-
stances, a shareholder is faced with a number of difficulties when trying to exercise his
rights or transfer his shares.
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instruments and bills of exchange.48 While these goals are
mostly declaratory in nature, the emphasis placed by the Frame-
work Decree on creating a favorable investment climate, integra-
tion into international capital markets, modern management
practices in state-controlled privatized enterprises, inflation cog-
nizance in financing the federal budget, and eradication of
fraud in the market demonstrates that Russia intends to base its
securities regulations on the same general principles found in
capital markets in the West.
On June 16, 1997 President Yeltsin ordered the creation of
a commission to protect investor rights and then appointed
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to preside. The resulting
State Commission on the Protection of Investors on the Russian
Securities Market ("State Commission") includes members from
the Central Bank, the Interior Ministry, and the Supreme Court.
The State Commission controls and investigates violations of in-
vestors' rights and enacts procedures for the administration of
lawsuits and enforcement of judgments.49 The notorious court
decisions in favoring Western shareholders over management of
Russia's largest steel plant, AO Novolipetsk Metallurgical
Kombinat ° ("Novolipetsk"), mark the beginning of a new legal
era on the untested ground of Russian securities law. In April
1997, Novolipetsk's domestic investors, including Moscow-based
investment bank Renaissance Capital Group and its Sputnik
Funds division (whose shareholders include billionaire George
Soros), the Harvard University Endowment, Bahamas-based
Cambridge Capital Management Ltd. (a hedge fund)," and
MFK, a Russian investment bank subsidiary of Russia's Unex-
imbank, brought four lawsuits against Novolipetsk. These inves-
tors, who together held more than fifty percent of the company's
shares, demanded proportional seats on the board of directors
and claimed that some stock had been wrongly converted into
nonvoting shares.52 The three-judge panel of the Lipetsk Arbi-
tration Court, a civil court in the city of Lipetsk, ruled for the
48. President's Decree No. 1008, supra note 44, art. I § 3, at 6.
49. Erin Arvedlund & Vladimir Tordes, Investor Rights get a Boost in Russia, NAT. L.
REP., Aug. 4, 1997, at 14a.
50. Id.
51. Id.
.52. Id.
17831998]
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investors in May of 1997,"3 ordering Novolipetsk's management
to submit to a shareholder vote at the July 12, 1997 shareholder.
Parties in these disputes agree on the positive fact that the
judges remained impartial. According to Vladimir Lisin, a direc-
tor of the steelmill, the court's decisions were very objective.54
In addition, several U.S. lawyers agreed that the court's decisions
evidenced the improving legal standards for protection of for-
eign investors in Russia. Brian L. Zimbler, partner at the Mos-
cow office of New York-based law firm LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene &
MacRae L.L.P., has stated that Russian courts have begun to
comprehend shareholder rights, and that, despite pressure of
negative public opinion, they are willing to bring justice to this
delicate area of corporate law by ruling for non-Russian inves-
tors.55 According to Bruce W. Bean, a partner at New York-based
Coudert Brothers' seventeen-member Moscow office, "arbitra-
tion courts are what count for foreign investors," and, "the deci-
sions have certainly come out the right way. Now the question is
one of enforcement. 56
In July 1996, the Central Bank issued Instruction No. 4557
to ease restrictions on foreign investment in the government se-
curities market. Instruction No. 45 provides for type S ruble
bank accounts and regulates the procedure for operating such
accounts.58 Pursuant to Instruction No. 45, non-residents must
open a type S ruble account to invest in Russian government
securities.59 Any non-resident may open an S account, but may
open only one such account at each bank that is licensed by the
Central Bank to offer S accounts.6 ° The Central Bank has given
permission to a number of the largest banks in Russia to conduct
operations with S accounts.61
Individuals can use S accounts to effect only those catego-
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Special Type 'S' Accounts in the RF Currency, Central Bank Instruction 45
(Russ. 1996), available in 1996 WL 8952972.
58. Id. § 1.1, at 1.
59. Id. § 1.2, at 1.
60. Id. § 1.4, at 1.
61. Id. § 1.3, at 1. The list of authorized banks includes Sberbank of Russia,
UNEXIM Bank, Bank Menatep,JSB Inkombank, Russian Credit Bank, Alfa-Bank, MJSB
"Vozrozdeniye", Avtobank, SBS-AGRO, and Promstroybank of Russia. Id.
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ries of transactions that Instruction No. 45 permits.6 2 Thus, for
example, a non-resident can not deposit ruble revenues from
the sale of goods or services in Russia into an S account. Non-
residents also cannot invest S account funds in privatized Rus-
sian enterprises. Instruction No. 45 permits non-residents to
withdraw S account rubles in order to acquire GKOs and OFZs,6 3
pay expenses in connection with the purchase of GKOs and
OFZs, purchase hard currency for "conversion operations," and
conduct all other transactions permitted by legislation, including
payment of tax obligations arising from the purchase or sale of
GKOs and OFZs.64 As a general matter, therefore, a non-resi-
dent may withdraw rubles from an S account to purchase govern-
ment securities, and to pay corresponding expenses and taxes.
Apart from S accounts, a non-resident may use a type I account
to transfer hard currency abroad. The amendments to Instruc-
tion No. 1665 permit non-residents to transfer funds from a type
T account, which is principally used to deposit rubles from sales
of goods and services, to a type I account.66
In December 1995, Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and Anatoly
Chubais, the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federa-
tion and Chairman of the Commission, signed a Memorandum
of Understanding and Protocol.67 This document defined the
bilateral relationships and constructive efforts that experts con-
sider as fundamental to driving the improvement of law enforce-
ment and regulation in the Russian securities market. In Levitt's
opinion, the Memorandum of Understanding "is a prime exam-
ple of enforcement cooperation between securities regulators."68
The Memorandum of Understanding emphasizes the vital im-
62. Id. § 1.5, at 1.
63. Id. § 3.1 (b), at 3. GKOs are short- term, zero coupon, ruble-denominated
treasury bills. OFZs are long-term, floating rate, ruble-denominated Federal loan
bonds.
64. Id. §§ 3.2 (a)-(d), at 3.
65. Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Procedure for Opening and Operat-
ing Accounts of Non-Residents in the Currency of the Russian Federation by Author-
ized Banks, Instruction 16 (1993) (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
66. Amendments and Addenda, Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Instruc-
tion No. 16 (1993), available in 1996 WL 8952961.
67. Olga Proskurina, Stock Markets Commissions in Russia and U.S.A. Have Declared
War on Crooks, BIzEKoN NEws, Dec. 9, 1995.
68. U.S. and Russian Securities Commissions Sign Memorandum of Understanding, 6
Russ. & COMM. Bus. L. REPT. 18 (1996).
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portance of forming markets with integrity and creating enforce-
ment mechanisms to eliminate fraud. In addition, it expresses
the popular belief that in order to secure markets from
criminals, law enforcement authorities must have access to infor-
mation on matters relating to possible violations of the securities
law.69 Significantly, Yuriy Kotler, a spokesman for the Commis-
sion, stated that "raising the confidence of the Russian public is
a problem. 70
The Russian Government has great expectations for the
concept of share investment funds which it believes will tap the
savings of the Russian public (that currently amount to US$30
billion according to estimates by the Commission) and finance
Russian businesses (which are currently in extreme need of capi-
tal investment). Having suffered huge losses in pyramid invest-
ing schemes, such as MMM and Tibet, the Russian public has
some reservations about investing in the stock market. Fund
managers thus ask the question whether average Russians can be
persuaded to invest in share investment funds the way Wes-
terners have invested in mutual funds. Some Western fund man-
agers answer this question in the affirmative, and enter the Rus-
sian market either to work for Russian asset management compa-
nies or to set up their own.
President's Decree No. 765 of July 26, 199571 laid the
groundwork for the creation of share investment funds "in order
to create proper conditions for the effective use of the savings of
citizens, to attract investors for investment activities, and to in-
crease the effectiveness of investment policy of Russian Federa-
tion."72 According to Charles Mallory, general director of Credis
Moscow AO, a wholly owned subsidiary of Credit Suisse that
manages a share investment fund under licence from the Com-
mission, getting the license was not easy.73 By imposing the li-
censing hurdle, the Commission ensures that only highly-quali-
fied and well-capitalized experts manage the funds.
69. Id.
70. Western Companies are Setting Up Share Investment Funds in Russia, 7 Russ. &
COMM. Bus. L. REPT. 13 (1996).
71. On Additional Measures to Improve Investment Policy, President's Decree No.
765, (Russ. 1995), available in 1995 WL 9700089.
72. Id. at pmbl.
73. Western Companies are setting up Share Investment Funds in Russia, 7 Russ. &
COMM. Bus. L. RErP. 13 (1996).
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Nency Herring, the new chief investment manager at Troika
Dialogue, a recently-licensed fund asset management company,
stated that Troika intends to address the confidence problem
through marketing and stressing to the public that the original
fund is government-backed and, therefore, quite safe. Herrig is
confident that average Russians who cannot protect their savings
from inflation will find that Troika's financial products offer the
perfect means to do so. Foreigners can buy into the share invest-
ment fund through I accounts.
7 4
A. The Problems and Solutions in Trading Russian Securities
The 1991 Russian privatization law transformed Soviet eco-
nomic units into joint stock companies by issuing stock and dis-
tributing it to private owners pursuant to the privatization pro-
gram.75 Because the stock of Russian firms is not memorialized
in certificates, the primary evidence of one's ownership share is
an entry in the firm's shareholder register. Regulations issued in
1993 provided that companies with more than 1,000 sharehold-
ers must maintain such registers with independent registrars. 76
Russian companies have chosen to ignore the independent reg-
istrar requirement and instead choose to maintain the register
themselves. Developing an industry of independent registrars
takes time. Moreover, because companies could still receive state
credits in 1994 and early 1995, market discipline that derives
from the need to raise capital was largely missing.
Because many firms did not establish a register for share-
holders at all, investors often found that they purchased an un-
documented and, therefore, illegal block of shares. Investors
who experienced problems with a company or the shares issued
had no legal recourse. To date, notwithstanding the substantial
development of the legal standards governing security transac-
tions over the last few years, title registration procedures applica-
ble to shareholders remain legally and technically cumbersome,
particularly for non-Russian shareholders. These problems,
along with Russia's political and macroeconomic instability,
74. Id.
75. Russian Federation Privatization of State and Municipal Enterprises Act
(1991), available in 1991 WL 3371322.
76. Measures to Ensure the Rights of Shareholders, President's Decree No. 1769
art. 4. § 1, at 3 (Russ. 1993), available in 1993 WL 10409648.
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posed a great disincentive for investment in the Russian securi-
ties market.
By mid-1995, organizations engaged in maintaining regis-
tries fell into six categories:
-Joint stock companies maintaining their own share regis-
tries;
-Organizations established by an issuer (also known as
"pocket registrars," usually companies set up as specialized
registrars, depositories and investment companies);
-Specialized-Independent registrars;
-Banks;
-Investment firms (including broker-dealers); and
-Depositories (primarily organizations having the word "de-
pository" in their name, but whose major line of activity is
maintaining registers).
Joint stock companies maintained more than fifty percent
of the registers in Russia in 1995. About eighty percent of the
companies maintaining their own registers had fewer than
10,000 shareholders. These companies have chosen to maintain
their own registers in order to preserve control of the company
and its shareholders, and because either other alternatives did
not exist in the region where the company was located, or the
company could not afford to retain a professional registrar. The
Commission's registrar audit team cites noncompliance with the
independent registrar requirement as the most common viola-
tion. Many companies with 500 or more shareholders continue
to maintain their own registries due to the high costs of in-
dependent registry services and the limited trading volume of
their shares. Audits conducted by the Commission often un-
cover conflicts of interest among registry service providers, in-
cluding findings that registrars also perform brokerage services,
that employees of the registrar actively trade shares, and that the
registrar is a shareholder of the issuer. Other problems encoun-
tered by the Commission include refusal by the registrar to regis-
ter share transactions without legal cause, failure to register
transactions within the statutory time period, incomplete infor-
mation maintained in personal accounts, and incomplete or
otherwise deficient share extracts.
InJuly 1995, the Commission issued regulations on the pro-
INVESTING IN RUSSIAN SECURITIES
cedure for licensing registrars.77 The regulations also define the
rights and responsibilities of registrars, transfer agents, share-
holders, and nominee shareholders in detail, and require that
registers exist in either paper or electronic form.7 a In addition,
the regulations set forth what information must be included in
the register, including all registered pledges and encumbrances
affecting the securities.79 Furthermore, the regulations provide
that entries relating to transfers of securities must be made
within three days of the date of submission to the registrar of the
documents required by the regulations for transfer of owner-
ship. ° Finally, registrars are prohibited from imposing addi-
tional requirements to conduct transfers"' and may not perform
other types of professional activities in the securities market.8 2
Most analysts expect a significant consolidation of registrars
by the end of 1998. Consolidation should reduce the number of
small and medium-sized registrars and/or increase the size of
other registrars. Greater use of nominee ownership in the fu-
ture will dramatically reduce the volume of transactions
processed by registrars. The Commission's prohibition against a
registrar's pursuit ofjoint activities in the capital market will also
force certain registrars out of the business. In the future, the
registrar business will most likely merge with bank affiliates, spe-
cialized registrars, and depositories. Depositories may specialize
as registrars or provide nominal holding and custodial services.
A main cause for this consolidation, other than the operation of
ordinary market forces, is the fact that main business centers
such as Moscow and St. Petersburg already have an adequate
number of registrars. Moscow currently has the highest concen-
tration of large registrars.
Depositories operate differently than a registrars, although
the two systems have much in common. Like a registry, the de-
pository places accepted share certificates in open or closed stor-
age. These two types of storage vary in their record-keeping
77. Rules of Licensing of Activity in Keeping Registrars of Holders of Registered Securities,
Federal Commission Decree 3, July 12, 1995 (visited Feb. 20, 1998) <http://koi-
www.fe.msk.ru/infomarket/fedcom/ewelcome.html> (also on file with the Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal).
78. Id. art. 3 § 1.2.
79. Id. art. 3 § 1.4.
80. Id. art. 4 § 1.2.
81. Id. art. 3 § 1.5.
82. Id. art. 3 § 1.8.
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methods. In closed storage, each security certificate is num-
bered and registered to a specific owner. In open storage, secur-
ities within a certain category are not designated to particular
owners. Securities are inventoried in a depository through a sys-
tem of deposit accounts. These accounts are divided into active
accounts, which record the quantity of securities kept in the
given place, and passive accounts, which list the securities be-
longing to specific clients. In order to open an account, a client
must execute a deposit agreement with the depository. The cli-
ent may include in the deposit agreement provisions assigning
certain rights to the depository. These may include the right to
use the client's dividends to purchase more securities, or the
right to engage in other operations of nominee holders.
To execute a transaction involving securities held in a de-
posit account, a client must present the depository with a trans-
fer instruction. An account holder wishing to transfer shares has
the option of transferring the shares into an escrow account.
While in such an account, the transferor holds title to the securi-
ties but cannot access them in any way. Upon receipt of pay-
ment confirmation, the depository transfers the securities into
the deposit account of the transferee, at which point the trans-
feror loses all rights to the transferred securities. When present-
ing a client with information on the client's deposit account, the
depository furnishes information on the storage status of its se-
curities. This information is of particular importance to a client
who conducts a large volume of transactions on the securities
market.
Trade settling and clearing has developed relatively slug-
gishly in Russia. The original vision for settlement and clearing
espoused by market participants and government officials in late
1993 and early 1994 involved a national network of clearing and
settlement organizations which would provide nominee owner-
ship trading and bookkeeping for customers of participating
banks and brokers within a centralized system. Maintained by
technical assistance funds, settlement institutions were created
in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, and Vla-
divostok. These had unified technical support systems and were
to provide inter-regional settlement accommodations.
Although these settlement facilities continue to exist and
function today, their trade settlement activities remain insuffi-
cient, and payment on delivery does not yet exist. Most transac-
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tions continue to be settled by brokers via telephone and fax,
and the vast majority of funds settlement takes place offshore.
Although each of the settlement organizations had start-up diffi-
culties, the most significant reason for their limited development
to date is the lack of demand for such services by market partici-
pants, including brokers and registrars. As the Russian market
progresses, and market participants gain experience, settlement
and clearing systems will develop along with the securities indus-
try infrastructure.
The Moscow settlement organization, known as the Deposi-
tory Clearing Company ("DCC"), was founded in November
1993. Initially established as the centralized depository and set-
tlement facility for the country, the DCC has been the most ac-
tive of the organizations originally formed to clear the over-
whelming majority of securities transactions conducted in Mos-
cow. The lack of an unambiguous legal foundation and clear
determination of the tax treatment of nominee ownership rele-
gated the DCC to acting as a re-registration agent for the first
eighteen months of its existence. The DCC operated as a cou-
rier service, providing collection services, transmitting docu-
ments for re-registration, and delivering extracts and other types
of paperwork from the registrar to the shareholders or brokers.
The DCC is linked electronically to the Russian Trading Sys-
tem ("RTS"), although the use of this process has been nar-
rowed to a limited number of pilot trials. In the fall of 1995, the
RTS and the DCC established a procedure to download elec-
tronic files from RTS to the DCC once each business day. To
notify the DCC of a trade for settlement, a broker can mark the
trade for the batch downloaded to the DCC at the time when the
broker registers the trade with the RTS. The broker must also
send trade documents along with the written confirmation to
the DCC in order to request settlement. In order for DCC to
settle a trade, each of the brokers for the buyer and seller will
generate its written communication with the DCC. This commu-
nication is then entered into the DCC's system, matched, and
the trade is entered on the specified date. Thus, although elec-
tronic clearing is possible, it has proven a time-consuming, labor-
intensive process and thus has rarely been used.
An alternative trade settlement concept being discussed in
Russia is a nationwide "umbrella" network of regional settlement
organizations. In this scheme, the DCC would not operate as a
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central depository with regional branches, but rather as the re-
gional subsidiary of the main network for settling trades in the
Moscow region. A newly-created "umbrella" database would be
formed as the centralized main computer where inter-regional
settlement is dispatched through the network of regional deposi-
tories. There has also been discussion of developing certain
bank depositories for securities settlement in Russia, but brokers
are likely to reject a settlement system that is wholly owned and
controlled by a third party and that sets its own fees and proce-
dures.
Payment on delivery has not yet been achieved in Russia,
although the DCC is currently working to achieve this by devel-
oping a funds settlement system with a specialized settlement
bank. Problems such as costly currency conversion, expensive
custody service, poor information supply, specific market prac-
tices, confusing tax conventions, and unpredictable investment
policies have driven most settlement procedures offshore. The
complexity and instability of the Russian Central Bank's clearing
system has encouraged financial organizations to avoid it and set
up a separate system for clearing transactions within Russia. For
example, commercial banks have established a system of corre-
spondent accounts among them in order to escape the Central
Bank system. This system, however, lacks a centralized hub.
Most analysts and market participants today feel that payment on
delivery could be implemented rapidly in Russia as soon as the
economic and political environment permits. Before domestic
market demand for settlement can result in its implementation,
however, significant improvement in the Russian tax laws gov-
erning securities transactions, further market development, and
macroeconomic stabilization must occur.
Domestic custodial services are developing in Russia. Sev-
eral large non-Russian banks holding Russian banking licenses
have provided limited custody services to their international affil-
iates or customers investing in Russian equities. Most notably,
Chase Manhattan Bank's Moscow affiliate has provided these
services to some customers of its London-based global custodian,
including Templeton Funds. Credit Suisse, ING Bank Eurasia,
and Citibank have also provided custodial services for their cli-
ents. Custodial services generally include the following:
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-registration and confirmation of ownership with company
registrars;
-clearance of a securities purchase;
-custody of certificates and extracts;
-representation at shareholder meetings; and
-collection of income.
Additional services, such as proxy solicitation, tabulation,
and tax reclamation, may soon be available from these custodi-
ans. Many Russian banks have also developed "custody" depart-
ments during recent years, but act only as depositories for regis-
tration with company registrars, safekeeping of certificates and
registrar extracts, and the receipt of dividend income.
The legal infrastructure for custodial or depository services
in Russia needs further development. The State Property Com-
mittee first regulated depositories in 1994.83 Its regulations de-
fined depository activity as the safekeeping of securities and/or
keeping a record of the rights of individuals using such serv-
ices." Four types of organizations were allowed to perform de-
pository activities. These included investment institutions, stock
exchanges, special depositories performing exclusively deposi-
tory activities, and specialized settlement-depository organiza-
tions.8s
Under the regulations, depository activity could only be
conducted pursuant to a license from the Securities Committee
(a predecessor of the Russian Securities Commission). No
licenses were ever issued. The regulations prohibited deposito-
ries from conducting the following activities:
-conducting transactions on their own behalf in the securi-
ties they held;
-transferring securities to the management of a third party;
-representing the shareholder at general meetings of the
company; and
-giving security over the shares for their own obligations.8 6
Two market developments have increased the demand for
custody services in Russia, thus accelerating the growth of custo-
dians. The first development is the increasing interest of foreign
83. Statute of Depositories, Russian Federation Committee for Management of
State Properties, Order 859-r (1994), available in 1994 WL 9141249.
84. Id. art. 1.1 § 2, at 1.
85. Id. art. 2.1 §§ 1-4, at 4.
86. Id. art. 3.1 §§ 1-4, at 6.
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institutional investors in investing in Russian securities. The reg-
ulations of these investors' domestic regulators, however, require
that they invest through local qualified custodians, which did not
exist until recent years. In April 1995, the Division of Investment
Management of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") assured the newly-created closed-end Templeton Russia
Fund in a no-action letter, that so long as certain conditions
were met, the Fund could invest in the equity securities of Rus-
sian issuers without risking an enforcement action pursuant to
Section 17(f) and Rule 17f-5 of the U.S. Investment Company
Act of 1940.87
The custodial arrangement set up by the Templeton Fund
and Chase Manhattan Bank, NA to address potential risks in the
Russian share registration system, and which provided the basis
for the SEC's no-action letter, included several important qualifi-
cations. First, Chase Manhattan was to act as custodian, and
enter into a subcustodial arrangement with its wholly-owned af-
filiate, Chase Moscow. Chase Moscow was to personally register
the transfer of share ownership, and to pay for the transfer only
after a register extract was issued. Chase agreed to sign a con-
tract with the registrar of each registered issuer. The contract
gave the custodian the right to conduct regular share confirma-
tions, hold shares in its name as nominee, and have its in-
dependent auditors periodically verify the share register. Also
under the agreement, the U.S. parent bank would incur liability
for the negligence or misconduct of the subcustodian. Finally,
the Templeton Fund's directors were periodically required to
examine the custodial arrangements and review the suitability of
Russian equity investments owned by the fund.
Subsequently, the SEC's Division of Investment Manage-
ment issued another no-action letter with respect to custodial ar-
rangements set up with ING Bank and Uneximbank, which an-
nounced at the beginning of May 1996 that their custodial ar-
rangements for holding Russian equities had been approved.
These no-action letters by the SEC have effectively opened up
the Russian equities market to funds based in the United States.
Credit Suisse and Vneshtorgbank have also applied to the SEC
87. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1994). The Investment Company Act of 1940 permits an
investment company to maintain foreign securities held by an eligible custodian in or-
der to effect its foreign securities transactions. Id.
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for no-action letters with respect to their custodial arrange-
ments. These banks have announced that they will begin to of-
fer full custodian services by the end of 1997, including settle-
ment services, safekeeping, corporate actions, income collection,
customer reporting, tax support services, and foreign exchange
services.
The second market development is the emerging mutual
fund market that has stimulated the demand for and the devel-
opment of local custodians. The regulatory framework for Rus-
sian mutual funds, adopted by the Russian President, 8  requires
that domestic fund managers have in place a contract with a spe-
cial depository in order to receive a license to establish a fund.89
C. Raising Capital Abroad
Russian businesses are currently using several methods to
raise capital abroad. These include establishing investment
funds,90 solicitating investments, offering of shares of offshore
companies which own Russian securities," and offering deposi-
tory receipts. Each of these alternatives enable investors to in-
vest in Russian securities without direct contact with Russian tax
authorities and without requirements to comply with Russian
currency laws. The most popular of these methods is the offer-
ing of securities of a non-Russian company that owns or has the
right to acquire an interest in a Russian company or project.
Several foreign companies have followed this route in Russia, in-
cluding the Petersburg-based Long Distance, Inc., whose offer-
ing was registered in the United States with the SEC and raised
nearly US$100 million. Typically, however, an offering is pri-
vately placed with a limited group of investors to avoid the cost
of complying with regulations applicable to public offerings.
Another very productive means to raise capital for Russian
companies is by offering American Depository Receipts
("ADRs"). A depository receipt is a negotiable certificate issued
by a Western bank, representing company shares that are on de-
88. Additional Measures to Improve Investment Policy, President's Decree No. 765
(Russ. 1995), available in 1995 WL 9700089.
89. Id. art. 3 §§ 2-3.
90. Seth A. Fineberg, TUSRIF Raising First Private Venture Fund, VENTURE CAP. J.,
Dec. 1, 1997, at 30-31.
91. Iya Motskobili, Russian Shares in the Bermuda Triangle, BIzEKON NEws, May 17,
1997.
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posit with the bank (or, in this case, a local Russian bank) that
acts as custodian on the Western bank's behalf. ADRs were in-
vented in 1927 in response to a law enacted in Great Britain
prohibiting British companies from registering shares abroad
without a British transfer agent. UK shares were not allowed to
leave the UK physically, and, in order to accommodate U.S. in-
vestor's demand, the American Depositary Receipt was created.
ADRs exist in five forms.
1. Unsponsored ADRs
An unsponsored ADR program may be set up by U.S. banks
on their own initiative, without the involvement of the non-U.S.
issuer. The U.S. bank establishing an unsponsored ADR pro-
gram offers the ADRs to the public in exchange for shares of the
non-U.S. company. Registration with the SEC is made on Form
F-6, which does not require disclosure concerning the non-U.S.
issuer or any authorization from the company. In addition, this
registration does not give rise to any reporting obligation for the
non-U.S. company. The U.S. depositary bank retains total dis-
cretion over the conduct of the ADR program, including the op-
tion to terminate it.
2. Level I ADRs
Level I ADRs trade in the over the counter ("OTC") public
markets under the registration and reporting exception in Rule
12(g) (3)-(2) (b) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934.92
Level I ADRs provide issuers with a simple and efficient means of
building a core group of investors with minimal regulatory and
reporting requirements. A Level-I program is generally viewed
as the first step into the U.S. public equity market.
3. Level II ADRs
Level II ADRs trade on NASDAQ or on an exchange in com-
pliance with the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 registra-
tion and reporting requirements. The issuer does not register a
public offering at the time of listing. Companies that want to list
their securities on a U.S. exchange use sponsored Level-II ADRs.
92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12(g) (3)-(2) (b).
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Level II programs require more SEC filings and involve greater
compliance with exchange rules.
4. Level III ADRs
Level III ADRs can be used by companies listed on a major
exchange that wish to raise capital in the United States. Level III
Depositary Receipts are sold to the public in a public offering.
The issuer registers the offering under the U.S. 1933 Securities
Act and reports under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933. Spon-
sored Level-III ADRs are listed on an exchange.
5. Rule 144A Private Placement ADR
Rule 144A93 Depository Receipts trade on portal9 4 in the
United States. Because no reporting or registration is required,
investors must rely on less information. Portal is a very restricted
system, and thus Rule 144A ADRs lack the liquidity of registered
issues.
Depository receipts allow a company to reach a wider mar-
ket than its home country. The largest ADRs market is in the
United States, where the trading volume of ADRs is now over ten
percent of the NYSE volume.95 ADRs are widely recognized as
the optimal method for domestic U.S. investors to invest in non-
U.S. securities.
According to information at the Russian exchange, 96 four-
teen Russian companies trade ADRs or are themselves listed at
New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange.
Among these, the biggest are AO Mosenergo, LUKoil,
Vimpelcom, and JSC Rosneftegazstroy 7 Information about
others is available from the Bank of New York, Merrill Lynch,
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.144A.
94. Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
Relating to the Operation of the PORTAL Market, 54 Fed. Reg. 49164 (Nov. 24, 1989).
Developed by the NASD to facilitate private placement transactions, portal is the acro-
nym for "private offerings, resales, and trading through automated linkages." Id.
95. Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, American Depositary Receipts (visited Feb. 17, 1998)
<http://www.adr-dmg.com/perspec.htm> (also on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
96. Russian Exchange information page at Web-site, A few useful references on Rus-
sian Securities traded abroad (visited Feb. 17, 1998) <http://www.re.ru/html/trade/
adre.html> (also on file with the Fordham International LawJournal).
97. Id.
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and Smith Barney. 98 The total amount of ADRs invested in the
Russian economy in 1997 was US$15 billion.99
D. Tax Regulations for Foreign Investors
According to the provisions of the Russian Federation Tax
Service Instruction 3410 ("Instruction 34"), foreign investors
must pay taxes on capital gains and dividends. Three issues arise
concerning the source of income: liability, withholding require-
ments, and treaty exemptions. Unless a treaty provides other-
wise, shareholders must pay Russian taxes on dividends earned
from Russian shares and on capital gains from the sale of such
shares. 101 A Russian company is required to withhold tax on
paid dividends,1"2 and a Russian purchaser of shares is obliged to
withhold capital gains tax at the time of payment unless evidence
is provided that the recipient of the money is registered with the
Russian tax authorities.1 03 Russian tax regulations do not re-
quire foreign purchasers to withhold capital gains tax unless they
are located in Russia or are registered with Russian tax authori-
ties. However, Russian law does set forth a clear method for cal-
culating capital gains. For example, under the current law, Rus-
sian purchasers cannot deduct the seller's basis from the
purchase price. Because the regulations provide that the Rus-
sian purchaser is liable for any shortfall in withholding,0 4 Rus-
sian purchasers often apply the withholding to the full purchase
price of the shares, regardless of the seller's basis or treaty pro-
tections.
Even assuming that the purchaser was willing to withhold
Russian tax on the gain alone, it is not clear how the seller's basis
would be calculated. For instance, assuming the initial purchase
was in rubles (the only lawful arrangement between a foreign
buyer and a Russian seller in the absence of a Central Bank li-
cense), it is not clear whether the basis would be the number of
98. Id.
99. Prema-Invest's Russia Report: Political and Economical Prospects, GLOBAL INVESTOR,
Feb. 1998, at 33.
100. Taxation of Foreign Legal Persons' Profit and Income, State Tax Service In-
struction No. 34 (Russ. 1995), available in 1995 WL 9700106.
101. Id. art. 5.3, at 20.
102. Id. art. 5.3 § 2, at 20.
103. Id. art. 6.4, at 21.
104. Id. art. 5.4, at 20.
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rubles then paid or the number of rubles which today are the
equivalent of the amount of hard currency which was converted
to rubles to pay for the shares. Given the vast ruble inflation
over the past few years, the former could obviously result in a far
higher gain, and therefore in a far higher tax. Because Russian
law contains no provisions for the indexing of capital gains, and
in view of the tax authorities' desire to maximize tax revenues, it
seems likely that a higher tax will be demanded.
As mentioned above, under certain double taxation treaties,
Russian taxes due on capital gains and dividends are reduced or
entirely eliminated. A foreign investor may claim an exemption
to get a prior exemption from the tax authorities, at least for the
payment of dividends. Because a Russian purchaser is liable for
failure to withhold, many Russian purchasers have insisted on
withholding tax on the full purchase price in the absence of a
clear exemption, thus forcing the foreign seller to apply for a
refund. Because investors will ordinarily pay for the shares they
purchase in rubles, the withholding and the refund should also
be in rubles, placing the currency risk on the seller.
In general, the procedure for obtaining treaty relief is still
developing in Russia. In order to claim treaty relief, a valid
treaty clearance must be obtained by completing the form speci-
fied by the Russian tax authorities, providing proof of tax resi-
dency in the foreign country (confirmed by the appropriate au-
thority in the foreign country), and submitting the proof to the
Russian tax authorities at the location where the income arises.
The paperwork required is cumbersome. Instruction 34 pro-
vides that under existing international treaties establishing lower
tax rates or a full exemption from taxation in the Russian Feder-
ation, the excess amount of tax withheld at the source will be
refunded provided application for the refund is made within
one year. 10 5 Because treaties take precedence over regulations,
it is unclear whether the requirement to apply for the refund
within one year is legal as applied to countries whose tax treaties
with Russia do not contain this requirement.
Two regulatory bodies-the Ministry of Finance and the
Anti-Monopoly Committee- must be notified of certain share
acquisitions. Notice to the Ministry of Finance is required upon
the acquisition of fifteen percent or more of the shares of a Rus-
105. Id. art. 6.2, at 21.
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sian company.1 °6 Notice needs not be given in advance but
rather within five days after the acquisition. 1 7 The Federal Anti-
Monopoly Committee must be notified if the assets either as
buyer or seller exceed 750 million rubles, 0 or in the event of:
-acquisition of more than 20 percent of the voting shares of
a company (this does not apply to establishment of a com-
pany);
-acquisition of ownership or use of fixed or intangible assets
along with the securities of a company where the book
value of the acquired assets exceeds 10 percent of the book
value of all assets of the company; and
-acquisition of rights which permit control of the company
or which permit the acquiror to carry out the functions of
the company's executive body.10 9
In addition, the Antitrust Committee must consent to the
above transactions if the acquiror has a market share of more
than thirty-five percent in certain specified industries? °
CONCLUSION
The Russian securities market is still in its infancy, with 1997
as only the sixth year of market reforms in this huge country.
Despite problems with privatization, dependence upon IMF
loans and private foreign investments, an undeveloped taxation
system, and political instability, the Russian Government has
managed to control the economy. Improvement of Russian se-
curities legislation is a primary goal of industry regulators under
the supervision of the Russian President and the Parliament.
Conflicts in the adopted progressive laws and underdeveloped
enforcement mechanisms stand in the way of effective securities
transactions and discourages foreign investment in the Russian
economy.
Recently-enacted laws have improved the situation with re-
106. Trading in Securities and Registration of Transactions, Ministry of Finance
Instruction No. 53 (Russ. 1992), available in 1992 WL 8933135.
107. Id.
108. Instruction on Rules for Control of Acquisition of Stakes and Holdings in
Partnerships and Ordinary inscribed Shares ofJoint Stock Companies, State Committee
for Management of State Properties, Order No. 5 art. 3, § 9 (Russ. 1994), available in
1994 WL 9141277.
109. Id. art. 1-3, at 1-4.
110. Id. § 10, at 3.
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gard to securities regulation and protection of the investors'
rights. Thanks to these positive changes, the level of foreign in-
vestment in Russia has increased from eighteen percent in 1996
to thirty percent in 1997 in the GKO and OFZ markets,111 and
from US$5.2 billion to US$15 billion for the ADRs market. 112 As
a result of Russia's efforts to liberalize the economy and enhance
its international credit rating, Russia was accepted to the Paris
and London credit clubs. 113
The Russian capital market features a variety of financial
products, including promissory notes' 4  and agricultural
bonds."' According to Alexander Livshits, deputy head of the
presidential staff and the former minister of finance, Russia ex-
pects to raise about US$3 billion through placement of converti-
ble bonds of Gazprom, UES, and other major companies, and to
place Federal Eurobonds of US$3.4 billion, regional Eurobonds
of US$1 billion, and T-bills of US$1 billion in 1998.116 Regard-
less of the Russian market's infancy and problems, it appears
that the "Russian Bear" woke up and started its way onto the
rough road toward a free market.
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